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This  paper  discusses  the impact  of art.  79(2)  of the General  Data  Protection
Regulation  (GDPR)  in international  litigation  over  online  privacy  violations.
The first  part  introduces  the tendency  of the European  legislator  to treat  private
international  law  problems  in the field  of data  protection  as isolated
and independent  from the traditional  secondary  private  international  law  acts.
The second  part  analyses  the current  status  quo  of international  jurisdiction
over online  privacy  violations  according  to Regulation  1215/2012.  After  briefly
examining the eDate and Martinez ruling (joined cases C-509/09 and C-161/10), it
concludes  that  the Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  has  stretched
the jurisdictional  grounds  of art.  7(2)  Regulation  1215/2012  too  far  in order
to afford  strong  protection  to data  subjects.  In that  sense,  it  raises  doubts
on whether art. 79(2) was necessary. Following this conclusion, it tries to explore
the uneasy  relationship  of GDPR  art.  79(2)  with the jurisdictional  regime
established under Regulation 1215/2012. Instead of an epilogue, the last part tries
to make  some  reflections  on the impact  of GDPR art.  79(2)  in privacy  litigation
cases involving non-EU parties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Conflict of laws problems related to data protection have already received
a unique  treatment  from the European  legislator  during  the adoption
of the Data  Protection  Directive.  The Data  Protection  Directive  had  been
prepared  during  the 1980s  and 1990s,  namely  during  a time  when
the current  Internet  was  still  just  at  the beginning  of its  creation
and of course not widely used. In the historical reality of the Data Protection
Directive,  the vast  amount  of international  exchanges  of personal
information were, more or less, a theoretical and mostly unlikely scenario.1
Although  created  in such  a historical  background,  the Data  Protection
Directive included provisions regulating the law applicable to transnational
data  flows.  These  were  to be  accommodated  in article  4(1)  of the Data
Protection Directive which reads as follows:
“1.  Each  Member  State  shall  apply  the national  provisions  it  adopts
pursuant  to this  Directive  to the processing  of personal  data  where:  (a)
the processing  is  carried  out  in the context  of the activities
of an establishment  of the controller  on the territory  of the Member  State;
when the same controller  is  established on the territory of several  Member
States,  he  must  take  the necessary  measures  to ensure  that  each  of these
establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the national law
applicable;  (b)  the controller  is  not  established  on the Member  State's
territory,  but  in a place  where  its  national  law  applies  by virtue
of international  public  law;  (c)  the controller  is  not  established
on Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes
use  of equipment,  automated  or otherwise,  situated  on the territory
of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes
of transit through the territory of the Community […]”.
By the time  of its  adoption,  article  4(1)  covered  many legislative  gaps
within  the system  of the protection  of personal  information  in the EU.
On the one  hand,  the major  concern  of the European  legislator  was
to prohibit  a situation  where  a data  controller  could  avoid
the implementation  of any  of the national  data  protection  laws  adopted
by the Member States. By the time of the adoption of the Directive, the basic
1 See  on that  Moerel,  L. (2011)  The long  Arm  of EU  data  protection  law:  Does  the Data
Protection  Directive  apply  to processing  of personal  data  of EU  citizens  by websites
worldwide? International Data Privacy Law, 1(1) p. 28.
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fear  was  that  a data  controller  might  relocate  his/her  activities  outside
of the EU,  while  still  continuing  to process  personal  information  of EU
citizens.  The three  indents  of art.  4(1)  were  designed  in order  to cover
the different aspects of that same danger:
• indent  a)  the situation  where  the data  controller,  while  having  its
main seat  outside the EU, still  actively conducts  business  with EU
citizens through an establishment within the EU,
• indent b) the situation where the data controller would be established
in territories  that  geographically  do  not  belong  to the European
continent,  but  are  still  controlled  by Member  States;  in that  case
the directive aimed at clarifying that it will be applicable to the extent
that under public international law, the legal order of a Member State
would still regulate the issues of that territory,
• indent c) the situation where the data controller, having its main seat
outside  the EU,  would  still  process  personal  information  of EU
citizens by using equipment located within a Member State, without
necessarily retaining an establishment in an EU Member State.2
On the other  hand,  art.  4(1),  although  not  primarily  an instrument
of private  international  law,  de  facto obtained  such  a role  within  the EU.
At the time  of its  adoption,  the basic  European  instrument  regarding
the law  applicable  in European  transactions  was  the Rome  Convention
of 1980, which only referred to certain contractual obligations without being
applicable to problems related to data protection law. Moreover, there was
still  no  unified  regime  regarding  non-contractual  obligations,  which
represented the main corpus of international data flows. Art. 4(1) was thus
called  upon to determine the law applicable  also  in cases  where  the data
flows were taking place purely between different Member States of the EU.3
The insertion  of a specific  conflict  of laws  regime  within  the Data
Protection  Directive  was  a major  departure  from the principle  of country
of origin that  was  predominant  at  similar  legislative  initiatives  of the EU
at the time.4 One might find such a departure reasonable if account is to be
2 Moerel, L. (2011) Back to basics: when does EU data protection law apply? International Data
Privacy Law, 1(2) pp. 92-110, esp. pp. 94-97, offers a very detailed account of the rationale
behind  art.  4(1) of the Data  Protection  Directive.  For  an early  account  of the same  see
Bygrave,  L.  (2000)  Determining  Applicable  Law  pursuant  to European  Data  Protection
Legislation. Computer Law & Security Report, 16 ,pp. 252-257.
10 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 11:1
taken of the complex and hybrid nature of Data Protection rules,5 which is
inextricably linked to the very particular nature of data as the subject matter
of legal  regulation  and the subsequent  discussion  whether  data  shall  be
provided for a specific set of rules rather than being covered by pre-existing
and non-data specific regulations.6
In addition,  the adoption  of the Data  Protection  Directive  was  a step
towards  an enhanced  protection  of the fundamental  right  to privacy;7 its
adoption  was  inspired,  in other  words,  from a clear  mandate  to expand
the protection of human rights  within the EU. During the same  period,  it
was  still  open  to debate  whether  EU  private  international  law  (both
procedural  and substantive)  was  taking  a similar  direction  towards
guaranteeing  the basic  freedoms  and rights  of EU  citizens.8 A  special
conflict  of laws  regime  for data  protection  law  was,  thus,  probably
stemming  from the anxiety  of the European  legislator  to guarantee  that
the strong  human rights  mandate  of the Data  Protection Directive  would
not be compromised by the different priorities of EU private international
law.
3 One can in that context better understand the mandate of art.  4(1)(a): “[…] when the same
controller  is  established  on the territory  of several  Member  States,  he  must  take  the necessary
measures  to ensure  that  each  of these  establishments  complies  with  the obligations  laid  down
by the national law applicable  […]”.  It is worth mentioning here that the Article 29 Working
Party has also classified art. 4 as a genuine private international law rule for intra-European
data flows. See WP 56, 30 May 2002, p. 6 where it is stated: “[…] Concerning the situations
within the Community, the objective of the directive is twofold: it  aims at avoiding gaps (no data
protection  law  would  apply)  and at  avoiding  multiple/double  application  of national  laws.
As the directive  addresses  the issue  of applicable  law  and establishes  a criterion  for determining
the law on substance  that  should provide  the solution to a case,  the directive  itself  fulfils  the role
of a so-called “rule of conflict” and no resource to other existing criteria of international private law
is necessary (emphasis  added)”.
4 See  for example  art.  3  of the E-Commerce  directive.  For  an analysis  of the functioning
of the principle of country or origin in E-Commerce see Savin,  A. (2013)  EU Internet  Law.
Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar, pp. 45-48.
5 Svantesson, D.J.B. (2013) A “layered approach” to the extraterritoriality of data privacy laws.
International  Data Privacy Law,  3(4) pp. 278-286, concludes that even within the premises
of private  international  law  per  se,  the nature  of data  protection  rules  is  complicated
and suggests that one cannot always cover them with the same conflict  of laws rule. He
tries, therefore, to classify them in three basic distinct private international law categories
and goes  on to examine  which rules  fit  the distinct  character  of different  data protection
rules better.
6 For a recent  debate  on the issue,  see  Woods,  A.K.  (2016)  Against  Data  Exceptionalism.
Stanford Law Review, 68(4) pp. 729-789, who provides some elaborate argumentation against
treating data  under a data specific  legal  regime,  while Svantesson,  D.J.B.  (2016) Against
“Against  Data  Exceptionalism”.  Masaryk  University  Journal  of Law  and Technology,  10(2)
pp. 200-211, argues for the opposite.
7 See Directive 95/46/EC of the of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data. Official Journal of the European Union (1995/L 281/31) 23
November.  Available  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017), recitals 7 and 8.
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In the meantime, though, there has been a clear convergence of the aims
of EU private international law and those of the Data Protection Directive.
Already  during  the middle  of the previous  decade  and in the shadow
of the discussion for the adoption of a European Constitution,9 the Council
urged a clear  strengthening  of the human rights  dimension of EU private
international law,10 while the Lisbon Treaty11 signaled the formal adoption
of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights as primary EU Law,12 a step that
radically changed the value system of EU private international law, making
the protection of fundamental rights its main priority.13 
One might, in that sense, argue that EU private international law was,
especially  after  the adoption  of the Lisbon  Treaty,  in a better  position
8 The Court  of Justice  was  nonetheless  trying  already during  the 80s  to establish  that  EU
private international law in general and the Brussels Convention in particular were aiming
at  strengthening  the legal  protection of EU  citizens  rather  than  just  promoting
the facilitation  of the common  market.  See  Duijnstee  v  Goderbauer  [1983],  case  C-288/82,
par. 11-12,  where  the Court  stated:  “[…] According  to the preamble  to the Convention,
the Contracting  States,  anxious  to "strengthen  in the Community  the legal  protection  of persons
therein  established",  considered  that  it  was  necessary  for that  purpose  "to determine
the international jurisdiction of their courts, to facilitate recognition and to introduce an expeditious
procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, authentic instruments and court settlements".
Both the provisions on jurisdiction and those on the recognition and enforcement of judgments are
therefore aimed at strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the Community […]”.
9 For  the background of this  initiative see  Pache,  E.  (2002)  Eine Verfassung  für  Europa  –
Krönung oder Kollaps der europäischen Integration? Europarecht, 37 pp. 767-784.
10 As it  has been documented in the Council’s Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom,
Security and Justice in the EU. Official Journal of the European Union, (2005/C 53/1) 03 March.
Available  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005X
G0303(01)&from=EN:PDF  [Accessed  7  June  2017],  p.  2:  “[…]  Fundamental  rights,
as guaranteed  by the European  Convention  on Human  Rights  and the Charter  of Fundamental
Rights in Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, including the explanatory notes, as well as the Geneva
Convention on Refugees,  must  be fully respected.  At the same time,  the programme aims at real
and substantial  progress  towards  enhancing  mutual  confidence  and promoting  common  policies
to the benefit  of all  our  citizens.  Incorporating  the Charter  into  the Constitutional  Treaty
and accession  to the European  Convention  for the protection  of human  rights  and fundamental
freedoms will  place  the Union,  including  its  institutions,  under a legal  obligation to ensure  that
in all its areas of activity, fundamental rights are not only respected but also actively promoted […]”.
11 For  a general  account  on the impact  of the Lisbon  Treaty  on the Institutional  values
of the EU, see among others Dougan, M. (2008) The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds
not Hearts. Common Market Law Review, 45(3) pp. 617-703, Harpaz, G. and Herman, L. (2008)
The Lisbon  Reform  Treaty:  Internal and External  Implications.  European  Journal  of Law
Reform,  10(4)  pp. 431-436, Terhechte, J.P. (2008) Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Grundlegende
Verfassungsurkunde  der  europäischen  Rechtsgemeinschaft  oder  technischer
Änderungsvertrag?  Europarecht,  43  pp.  143-190,  Pech,  L.  (2011)  The Institutional
Development of the EU Post - Lisbon: A case of plus ca change…?, UCD Dublin European
Institute Working Paper 11 – 5, December 2011, Goebel, R.J. (2011) The European Union
and the Treaty of Lisbon. Fordham International Law Journal, 34(5) pp. 1251-1268.
12 For the importance  and impact  of the primary  EU  status  awarded  to the Charter  under
the Lisbon  Treaty  see  Landau,  E.C.  (2008)  A New Regime of Human Rights  in the EU?
European Journal of Law Reform, 10(4) pp. 557 – 575, Pache, E. and Rösch, F. (2009) Die neue
Grundrechtsordnung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon. Europarecht, 44 pp. 769 – 790,
Lanaerts,  K.  (2012)  Die  EU  –  Grundrechtecharta:  Anwendbarkeit  und  Auslegung.
Europarecht,  47  pp.  3  – 18,  Sarmiento,  D.  (2013)  Who’s afraid of the Charter?  The Court
of Justice,  National  Courts  and the new  Framework  of Fundamental  Rights  Protection
in Europe. Common Market Law Review, 50(3) pp. 1267-1304.
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to accommodate  the protection  of personal  data  in cases  of international
data flows in a more comprehensive way.14
Such a line of thinking was not convincing either for the Court of Justice,
which  in the recent  VKI  v.  Amazon case15 confirmed  the special  role
of art. 4(1)  in determining  the law  applicable  to a certain  data  processing
activity  independently  from any  stipulations  found  in the Rome  I  and II
Regulations,16 or for the European  legislator,  who  isolated  the private
international  law  regime  of EU  Data  Privacy  law  even  further.  Art. 3
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the spiritual successor
of art. 4 of the Data Protection Directive, while art. 79(2) of the GDPR, which
lies  in the center  of this  contribution,  is  a novelty  in terms  of defining
the judicial  jurisdiction  over  violations  of data  protection  law.  Instead
of leaving the issues of judicial jurisdiction to be determined by the Brussels
Ia  Regulation  and the principles  developed  over  the past  decades
from the Court  of Justice  in interpreting  the latter,  the GDPR  went  as far
as to create  a special  jurisdictional  regime  for data  privacy  disputes.
13 See  the priorities  set  by the The  Stockholm Programme  — An  open  and secure  Europe
serving and protecting citizens. Official Journal of the European Union (2010/C 115/1) 05 May.
Available  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:
FULL&from=en:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017] p. 4, as well as the EU Justice Agenda for 2020,
COM(2014) 144 final.
14 Starting  as early  as the Brussels  Convention  of 1967,  one  might  argue  that  EU  private
international  law has accumulated a non-negligible  experience in dealing with the cross-
border dimension of the protection of fundamental rights.
15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Amazon [2016], Case C-191/15. 
16 Verein  für  Konsumenteninformation  v. Amazon  [2016],  Case  C-191/15,  par.  73-80.  That
the Rome II  Regulation is  not  applicable  to data  privacy issues  is  clear from art.  1(2)(g)
of the that Regulation. The applicability of the Rome I Regulation in data privacy issues has
not  been  explored  by the Court  prior  to this  case.  The Court  has  not  offered  a clear
justification  why  a clause  determining  the law  applicable  to a contract  does  not  affect
the data privacy  issues  attached  to it.  One might  reasonably assume that  this  is  related
to the wide  scope  of application  of art.  4(1)  of the Data  Protection  Directive.  It  seems,
namely,  that art.  4(1) of the Data Protection Directive covers data privacy issues in their
entirety, including the possibility of contractual determination of the law applicable. Since
art.  4(1)  of the Data  Protection  Directive  does  not  provide  for such  a contractual
determination of the law applicable, it must be concluded that such contractual clauses are
simply not allowed and, therefore, the Rome I Regulation cannot be called into application.
That  view  seems  to be  consistent  with  the major  goal  pursued  by art.  4(1)  of the Data
Protection Directive, namely the non-circumvention of EU data privacy law by clauses that
might  designate  as applicable  the law  of a country  with  less  stringent  data  privacy
stipulations.  See  in that  line  Kartheuser,  I.  and Klar,  M.  (2014)  Wirksamkeitskontrolle
von Einwilligungen  auf  Webseiten  Anwendbares  Recht  und  inhaltliche  Anforderung
im Rahmen gerichtlicher Überprüfungen. Zeitschrift für Datenschutz, 4(10) pp. 500-505. Piltz,
C. (2012) Rechtswahlfreiheit im Datenschutzrecht?  Kommunikation & Recht, 15(10) pp. 640-
644, considers data protection law to fall within art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation (overriding
mandatory  provisions)  and,  therefore,  also  suggests  that  a contractual  circumvention
of art. 4(1)  of the Data  Protection  Directive  shall  not  be  possible.  Despite  the interesting
argumentation,  this  opinion cannot be accepted without  reservations.  In excluding data
protection law from the scope of the Rome I Regulation, the Court of Justice did not argue
along these lines.
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The question whether  such  a specific  jurisdictional  regime was  necessary
and whether  the established  bases  of jurisdiction  provide  for a reasonable
and effective solution will be the subject of the analysis to follow.
2. IS ART. 79(2) OF THE GDPR NECESSARY?
2.1 THE SHEVILL IMPACT AND DOCTRINAL REACTIONS
A  brief  overview  of the jurisdictional  regime  for online  data  privacy
violations  under  the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  must  necessarily  start
from the decision  of the Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  (CJEU)
in the Shevill case.17 Although  the case  does  not  per  se  refer  to online
violations of data protection, it is the first one where the CJEU was called
upon  to examine  the functioning  of the Brussels  jurisdictional  regime
in a scenario  of ubiquitous  personality  infringements.  In  sum,  the case
revolved  around  the complaint  of Fiona  Shevill,  domiciled  in England,
against a newspaper established in France that published an article linking
Fiona  Shevill  to a drug  case.  The bulk  of the newspapers  containing
the article that Fiona Shevill found to be defaming for her was distributed
in France  (237.000  of them).  A considerably  lower  number  had  been
distributed  in other  Member  States  (15.500  of them),  and eventually  only
230  papers  made  it  to England.  Fiona  Shevill  decided  to sue  the French
newspaper in England,  and the main question that the CJEU had to tackle
was  whether,  under  the Brussels  jurisdictional  rules,  the English  Courts
could indeed adjudicate over the dispute.
In resolving  this  problem,  the CJEU  remained  consistent  with  its
previous  case  law  regarding  international  judicial  jurisdiction  over  tort
cases,18 declaring once more that, apart from being allowed to sue at Courts
of the domicile of the defendant,19 the victim of an alleged tort shall be able
to sue  either  in the place  where  the event  giving  rise  to the damage  took
place  or in  the place  where  the damage  occurred.20 The Court  went
on to accept  that  this  basic  scheme shall  remain applicable  to personality
17 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1994], Case C-68/93.
18 Most prominently the Bier v. Mines de potasse d'Alsace [1976], Case C-21/76.
19 Art.  4  REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 12  December 2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters  (recast).  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017].
20 Bier v. Mines de potasse d'Alsace [1976], Case C-21/76, par. 14-19.
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infringements  committed  via  mass  media  publications,21 even  more  so
because  in such  cases  the event  giving  rise  to the damage,  namely
the publication of the infringing information, will usually (but not always)
coincide  the domicile  of the defendant,  thus  stripping  the victim
of a potential  jurisdictional  basis.22 By allowing  the victim  to sue  in each
country  where  the alleged infringing  material  was  distributed,  the Court
tried to establish an additional forum that shall be in a (procedurally) better
position to adjudicate over ubiquitous personality disputes than the Courts
of the domicile of the defendant.23 Based on this better procedural position,
the Court  limited  the extent  of the jurisdiction  awarded  to the forum
of the place where the damaged occurred only within the limits of its own
territory.
Whether  one  agrees  with  the outcome  of the Shevill case24, or not,25
the dogmatic  consistency  of the ruling  with  the basic  jurisdictional
foundations  of the Brussels  regime  cannot  be  disputed.  In justifying
the formulation of the jurisdictional basis at the courts of the country where
the alleged  victim  suffered  the damage  in his/her  personality  rights,
the Court  explained  that  this  extension  of the available  fora  is  justified
by the axiom of sound administration of justice,  which is  the basic  reason
for the existence of the special  rule of jurisdiction for tort cases (nowadays
art. 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation).26
The ruling  of the CJEU  in Shevill has  functioned  as the starting  point
of the discussion  on how  to treat,  from an adjudicatory  jurisdiction  point
of view, the problem of violations of personality rights via the Internet. 
While  all  possible  variations  have  been  proposed  in legal  literature,27
21 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1994], Case C-68/93, par. 23.
22 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1994], Case C-68/93, par. 24-27.
23 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1994], Case C-68/93, par. 31.
24 In that  direction  among  others  Huber,  P.  (1996)  Persönlichkeitsschutz  gegenüber
Massenmedien im Rahmen des Europäischen Zivilprozeßrechts.  Zeitschrift für Europäisches
Privatrecht,  4(2)  pp.  295-313,  Wagner,  G.  (1998)  Ehrenschutz  und Pressfreiheit
im europäischen  Zivilverfahrens-  und  Internationalen  Privatrecht.  Rabels  Zeitschrift
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 62(2) pp. 243-285.
25 Among  others  Coester-Waltjen,  D.  (1999)  Internationale  Zuständigkeit
bei Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen.  In:  Festschrift  für  Rolf  A.  Schütze,  Munich:  C.H.
Beck, pp. 175-187.
26 Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA [1994], Case C-68/93, par. 31.
27 An exhaustive presentation of the different opinions expressed on the matter goes beyond
the scope  of the current  contribution.  For a neat  summary  of the academic  proposals
on how  to treat  personality  torts  over  the Internet  within  the premises  of the Brussels
jurisdictional regime see Marton, E. (2016) Violations of Personality Rights through the Internet:
Jurisdictional  Issues  under  European  Law.  Baden-Baden:  Nomos  Verlag;  Chawley  Park,
Cumnor Hill, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 201-231.
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from also  upholding  the Shevill case  law  for Internet  related  personality
violations28 to abandoning  them  in favour  of a plaintiff’s  forum29
or in favour of a targeting test,30 it  has not been disputed that the existing
jurisdictional rules of the Brussels regime provided an adequate basis (even
if modifications of the existing case law have been proposed as necessary)
to accommodate online violations of personality rights, including privacy.31
2.2 UPDATING SHEVILL: EDATE AND MARTINEZ CASE LAW
The definitive  answer  on whether  the Brussels  jurisdictional  regime  can
accommodate  personality  violations  over  the Internet  has  been  given
by the CJEU in the joined eDate and Martinez cases.32
Both  cases  share  a privacy  background.  In eDate,  a web  portal
established in Austria reported on a crime committed by a person domiciled
in Germany.  The person  was  convicted  for the crime  but  has  lodged
an appeal  against the conviction.  In order to force the web portal  to desist
from reporting the issue,  the person linked to the crime brought  an action
before  the German  courts,  claiming  that  the web  portal  shall  be  forced
to refrain from using his full name when reporting about him in connection
with  the crime  committed.  In Martinez,  French  actor  Olivier  Martinez
and his  father  brought  an action  before  the French  courts  against  MGN,
a company  established  in England,  because  in the website  of the Sunday
Mirror,  operated  by MGN,  there  was  a report  on their  private  lives
accompanied by pictures without their consent.
The CJEU was thus given the chance to examine the applicability of its
previous  Shevill case  law  in an Internet  context.  Inspired  by the findings
of AG Cruz Villalón,33 the Court found the Shevill case law not completely
28 See for example Stone P. (2006) EU Private International law. Harmonization of Laws. 2nd ed.
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2006, pp. 93-94.
29 Kubis,  S.  (1999)  Internationale  Zuständigkeit  bei  Persönlichkeits-  und Immaterialgüterrechts-
verletzungen. Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst und Werner Giesing, pp. 153-176.
30 Most  characteristically  Reymond,  M.  (2013)  Jurisdiction  in case  of personality  torts
committed over the Internet: a proposal for a targeting test.  Yearbook of Private International
Law, 14 pp. 205-246.
31 In urging  the European  legislator  to regulate  in a more  comprehensive  way  the private
international  law  issues  related to personality  rights  Hess,  B.  (2015)  The Protection
of Privacy in the Case Law of the CJEU. In: Burkhard Hess and Christina Mariottini (eds.)
Protecting  Privacy in Private International  and Procedural  Law and by Data  Protection.  Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag, pp. 112-113, suggests that such a future regulation shall be tailored
on the Brussels Ia Regulation and in the way the CJEU has interpreted its provisions.
32 eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Olivier Martinez v. MGN Limited [2011], joint Cases C-509/09
and C-161/10.
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satisfactory  for Internet  related  privacy  violations.34 It  came  to that
conclusion  after  performing  a scrutiny  of the characteristics  of online
communications.  Although  printed  mass  media  can  also  be  distributed
in a variety of countries,  Internet publications,  due to the incredible speed
and geographical  penetration  of the dissemination,  marginalise
the significance  of the place  of distribution  (named  as a major  connecting
factor under the Shevill case  law) and maximises  the scale of the exposure
of individuals to violations of their personality.35
In view of that,  the Court  performed a revision  of the Shevill case  law.
After declaring  that  the particularities  of Internet  communications  make
necessary  the existence  of a jurisdictional  basis,  independent
from the domicile of the defendant, where the victim of the alleged privacy
violation can claim protection for the full  scale of infringement,  the Court
decided  that  this  place  is  to be  found  in the Member  State  of the “centre
of the interests” of the alleged victim.36
In sum,  after  the eDate  and Martinez decision,  the alleged  victim
of an online  privacy  violation  could  sue  the perpetrator  in the following
places: 
• regarding  the full  extent  of the damage  in the Courts  either
of the domicile  of the defendant/perpetrator37 or in  the Courts
of the victim’s/plaintiff’s  centre  of interests,  which  in the majority
of the cases  (but  not  necessarily  always)  will  coincide  with
the victim’s/plaintiff’s domicile;38
• in  cases  where  the domicile  of the defendant/perpetrator  does  not
coincide with the place of distribution,39 the victim/plaintiff  can  sue
also  in the courts  of the Member  State  of the distribution  for the full
33 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in joint Cases eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Olivier Martinez
v.  MGN  Limited [2011],  C-509/09  and C-161/10,  par.  56-67.  Although  the Court  did  not
exactly adopt the jurisdictional ground proposed by the AG Villalón, in adapting the Shevill
case law for Internet related cases shared his view on the necessity of doing so.
34 eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Olivier Martinez v. MGN Limited [2011], joint Cases C-509/09
and C-161/10, par. 46.
35 eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Olivier Martinez v. MGN Limited [2011], joint Cases C-509/09
and C-161/10, par. 47.
36 eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Olivier Martinez v. MGN Limited [2011], joint Cases C-509/09
and C-161/10, par. 48.
37 Under  art.  4  of REGULATION  (EU)  No 1215/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters  (recast).  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF  [Accessed  7  June
2017].
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extent of the damage; 
• last, but not least, the victim can still make use of the Shevill case law,
allowing  him/her  to sue  in each  country  where  his/her  personal
information  has  been  illegally  processed,  albeit  only  to the extent
of the damage suffered in each of these countries.
The decision  created  polarised  reactions.  Some  commentators
considered  that  it  was  a step  in the right  direction,40 claiming  that
by creating a jurisdictional basis that allows the victim of an alleged online
privacy  violation  to sue  in the courts  of the Member  State  in which
the centre of his/her interests are located, it strikes a fairer balance between
the victim  and the perpetrator.  Other  commentators  praised the readiness
of the CJEU  to adapt  the jurisdictional  provisions  of the Brussels  regime
to the particularities  of online  communication,41 while  others  were  very
sceptical towards it, raising a series of legitimate concerns.42
Indeed,  the ruling  of the CJEU  in eDate  and Martinez signals  a stark
departure from the very fundamental principles of the jurisdictional scheme
of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Adapting the principles of a legal instrument
per se shall  not be viewed as a problem. What is  really problematic with
the eDate and Martinez decision is that it ignores the compelling reasons that
led  to the adoption  of the jurisdictional  principles  that  it  has  dismantled
without  providing  convincing  arguments  that  this  should  have  been
the case. 
It  must not be  forgotten that  the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Ia
38 Pursuant  to art.  7  (2)  of REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT  AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast).
Official  Journal  of the European  Union  (2012/L  351/1)  20  December.  Available  from:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:
pdf[Accessed 7 June 2017], as interpreted in the eDate and Martinez ruling.
39 For  example,  a data  controller  with  a statutory  seat  in Member  State  A  illegally  posts
personal  information  of the victim  via  the website  of a subsidiary  company  established
in Member State B and running its website in that Member State (Member State B).
40 Most  notably,  Hess,  B.  (2012)  Der  Schutz  der  Privatsphäre  im  Europäischen
Zivilverfahrensrecht. Juristen Zeitung, 67(4) pp. 189-193.
41 Bogdan,  M.  (2013)  Website  Accessibility  as Basis  for Jurisdiction  Under  the Brussels  I
Regulation in View of New Case Law of the ECJ.  In:  Dan Jerker  B.  Svantesson  and Stan
Greenstein (eds.) Internationalisation of Law in the Digital Information Society. Copenhagen: Ex
Tuto Publishing, pp. 159-172, esp. p. 167.
42 See  among  others  Heinze,  C.  (2011)  Surf  global,  sue  local!  Der  europäische
Klägergerichtsstand  bei  Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzungen  im  Internet.  Europäische
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 22(24) pp. 947-950, Mankowfski P. (2016) In: Ulrich Magnus
and Peter  Mankowfski  (eds.)  Brussels  Ibis  Regulation-Commentary.  Köln:  Verlag  Dr.  Otto
Schmidt KG, pp. 323-328.
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Regulation are based on the principle of “actor sequitur forum rei” established
in art. 4 of that Regulation.43 The adoption of “actor sequitur forum rei” was
not  a random  choice  but  has  a very  strong  justification  dating  back
to the adoption  of the Brussels  Convention.  The jurisdictional  provisions
of the Brussels regime and especially the jurisdictional basis of the domicile
of the defendant  share  an existential  bond  with  the provisions  that  refer
to the recognition  and enforcement  of judgements.44 Simply  put,
the simplification  of the recognition  and enforcement  of foreign  civil
judgements  between  the Member  States  of the EU45 is  a clear  procedural
advantage of the plaintiff, who is the hopeful beneficiary of the recognition
and enforcement.  The “actor  sequitur  forum  rei”  principle  aims
to counterpoise  this  procedural  advantage  by offering  a chance
to the defendant to procedurally defend him/herself on equal terms,46 given
that  in international  litigation  the risks  for the procedural  rights
of the defence are higher than those in plainly domestic cases.47
43 For the content  and the meaning  of the “actor  sequitur  forum  rei”  principle  within
the Brussels  jurisdictional  regime  see  Hess,  B. (2010) Europäisches  Zivilprozessrecht.
Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, pp. 265-271.
44 That  this  is  indeed  the case  see  Hallstein,  W.  (1964)  Angleichung  des  Privat-
und Prozessrechts  in der  Europäischen  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.  Rabels  Zeitschrift
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 28(2) pp. 211-231, esp. 223 where he notes:
„[…]  Die  Vereinfachung  und  Beschleunigung des  Exequaturverfahrens  allein  war  jedoch  nicht
ausreichend,  um  allen  Anforderungen  zu  genügen,  die  an ein  wirksames  Verfahren
der Rechtsverfolgung innerhalb eines einheitlichen Wirtschaftsraumes gestellt werden müssen. Man
denke zum Beispiel an die Fälle, in denen die Vollstreckung im Anerkennungsstaat verweigert wird,
weil  in diesem  Staat  ein  bereits  ergangenes  Urteil  unvereinbar  ist  mit  dem  Urteil,  um  dessen
Exequatur  nachgesucht  wird,  oder  weil  im Anerkennungsstaat  zwischen  denselben  Personen
und in derselben Sache  ein Verfahren schwebt.  Wollte  man die  Zahl  dieser  Fälle  verringern,  so
musste  auch  die  territoriale  Zuständigkeit  durch  das  neue  Abkommen  unmittelbar  geregelt
werden […]“.
45 Simplification that reached so far as to abolish the exequatur procedure from the Brussels Ia
Regulation. See on that Kramer, X.E. (2013) Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-bis
Regulation:  Towards  a New  Balance  between  Mutual  Trust  and National  Control
over Fundamental Rights. Netherlands International Law Review, 60 pp. 343 – 373, Geimer, R.
Unionsweite Titelvollstreckung ohne Exequatur nach der Reform der Brüssel I-Verordnung.
In:  Festschrift  für  Rolf  A.  Schütze,  Munich:  C.H.  Beck,  pp.  109 –  121,  Isidro,  M.R.
On the Abolition of Exequatur. In: Burkhard Hess and Maria Bergström and Eva Stroskrubb
(eds.)  EU Civil Justice: Current Issues and Future Outlook, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 283-
298.
46 In that sense the “actor sequitur forum rei principle“ is the jurisdictional mirroring of the non-
recognition  ground  referring to the judgements  that  are  given  in default  of appearance
of art. 45 Brussels Ia. See in that regard the ruling of the Court in Autoteile v. Malhé  [1985],
Case C-220/84, par. 15: “[…] According to article 2, persons domiciled in a Contracting State are
to be sued in the courts of that State. That provision is intended to protect the rights of the defendant;
it serves as a counterpoise to the facilities provided by the Convention with regard to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements […]”.
47 On that,  see the Jenard,  P.  Report  on the Convention  on jurisdiction and the enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  Official Journal of the European Union (1979/C
59/1)  05  March.  Available  from:  http://aei.pitt.edu/1465/1/commercial_report_jenard_C59
_79.pdf [Accessed 7 June 2017], p. 18.
2017] I. Revolidis: Judicial Jurisdiction over Internet Privacy Violations ... 19
Although  that  does  not  mean  that  the domicile  of the defendant  is
the only jurisdictional base to be found in the Brussels Ia Regulation, it still
puts  that  jurisdictional  ground  in the place  of the basic  rule.48 Save
for the exclusive  jurisdictional  bases  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation,49
the domicile of the defendant shall be the starting point of any international
dispute in the EU,50 including those that refer to online violations of privacy.
That  very  fact  shall  also  guide  the interpretation  of the additional  bases
of jurisdiction,  especially  those  located  in art.  7,  where  the special
jurisdiction for torts is also accommodated.
By this is meant that the interpretation of the jurisdictional bases located
in art. 7 of the Brussels Ia Regulation shall be restrictive, so that they do not
go  beyond  their  true  scope  of application,  as this  is  to be  found
in the reasons  that  justified  their  adoption.51 As  it  is  clear  both
from the recitals  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation52 and from an unbreakable
chain  of CJEU  decisions,53 the reason  for adopting  art.  7  in general
and the jurisdictional  base  for torts  in art.  7(2)  is  not  the protection
of the victims  of torts.  Art.  7  is  neutral  when  it  comes  to protecting
the individual  interests  of the parties.54 The real  reason for adopting art.  7
was  the efficacious  administration  of justice,  based  on the proximity
48 See Group Josi v UGIC [2000], Case C-412/98, par. 35.
49 Established  in art.  24  of REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT  AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast).
Official Journal of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from:http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF
[Accessed 7 June 2017].
50 The actor sequitur forum rei has even survived within the jurisdictional scheme of sections
3,  4  and 5  of REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial matters  (recast).  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017],
even if that happened in the form of equal alternative to the otherwise plaintiff favourable
jurisdictional grounds established thereof.
51 In that context see Handte v Traitements [1992], Case C-26/91, par. 14.
52 Recitals 15 and 16 REGULATION (EU) No 1215/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters  (recast).  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017].
53 Among  others  Tessili  v Dunlop  [1976],  Case  C-12/76,  par.  13,  Dumez  France  v Hessische
Landesbank [1989], Case C-220/88, par. 17 and most notably Besix v Kretzschmar [2001], Case
C-256/00, par. 31, where the Court stated: “[…] The reason for the adoption of the jurisdictional
rule … was concern for sound administration of justice and efficacious conduct of proceedings […]”.
54 For that  conclusion  see  Pointier,  J.A.  and Burg,  E.  (2004)  EU  Principles  of Jurisdiction
and Recognition  and Enforcement  of Judgements  in Civil  and Commercial  Matters  according
to the case law of the European Court of Justice. The Hague: TMC Asser Press, p. 160.
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of the bases  of jurisdiction found in this  article  to the procedural  elements
of a certain  case.55 By inserting  a non-existent  element  of protection
of the plaintiff in art. 7 in eDate and Martinez, the CJEU went far further than
the scope of this article without providing convincing reasons for doing so.
In addition,  the fact  that  the adoption  of the domicile  of defendant
as the basic  rule  of jurisdiction  within  the Brussels  is  directly  connected
with the idea of providing the procedural balance that was described above
means  that  the plaintiff  shall  not,  in principle,  acquire  any  procedural
advantages  in the territory  of adjudicatory  jurisdiction.  Favouring
the plaintiff  both  in terms  of adjudicatory  jurisdiction,  by uncontrollably
creating  fora  actoris,  and in  terms  of simplifying  the recognition
and enforcement  of judgements  would  turn  the Brussels  Ia  Regulation
from an instrument  that  aims  to facilitate  the protection  of human  rights
of all  EU  citizens  to an instrument  that  protects  only  the rights
of the plaintiffs.
There are many other points of the eDate and Martinez ruling that raise
legitimate  questions,56 such  as,  for example,  the additional  problems  that
stem  from the unreasonable  multiplication  of jurisdictional  bases  created
by the CJEU. Not only forum shopping in disputes regarding online privacy
violations is not only easier now, but one also cannot ignore the possibility
of different  Member  State  courts  rendering  contradictory  decisions
for the same  subject  matter,  undermining  legal  certainty  in the European
judicial  space.57 Nonetheless,  a detailed  and exhaustive  discussion
of the vices  and virtues  of the eDate  and Martinez ruling  goes  beyond
the scope of the current contribution.
What is really important to take away from the brief examination of that
case  is  that  the CJEU  was  ready  to go  as far  as to dismantle  the basic
jurisdictional  principles  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation,  and even  risk
the existence  of legal  certainty,  in order  to afford  a strong  protection
55 That this is the underlying principle especially of art. 7 (2) see Kropholler, J. and Von Hein,
J.  (2011)  Europäisches  Zivilprozessrecht-Kommentar  zu EuGVO, Lugano-Übereinkommen 2007,
EuVTVO, EuMVVO und EuGFVO. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmBH,
p. 201.
56 Dickinson,  A.  (2012)  By  Royal  Appointment:  No  Closer  to an EU  Private  International  Law
Settlement? [blog entry] 24 October. Conflict Of Laws.net. Available from: http://conflictof
laws.net/2012/by-royal-appointment-no-closer-to-an-eu-private-international-law-
settlement/  [Accessed  07  June  2017],  has  neatly  summarized  7  points  of critique
for the ruling.
57 Schmidt,  J.  (2015)  Rechtssicherheit  im  europäischen  Zivilverfahrensrecht.  Tübingen:  Mohr
Siebeck, pp. 133-138 presents some interesting argumentation in that direction.
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to the victims of online privacy violations. In view of the above, one might
legitimately  raise  doubts  on whether  an additional  jurisdictional  rule
for privacy violations, like the one established in art. 79(2) of the GDPR, was
necessary.
2.3 AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
The question becomes  even  more  reasonable  if  one  examines  the content
of art. 79(2) of the GDPR,58 which states:
“Proceedings  against  a controller  or a processor  shall  be  brought  before
the courts  of the Member  State  where  the controller  or processor  has
an establishment.  Alternatively,  such  proceedings  may  be  brought  before
the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual
residence,  unless  the controller  or processor  is  a public  authority
of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.”
The very  first  point  that  makes  the relationship  of GDPR  art.  79(2)
with the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  uneasy  is  the blurry  scope  of application
of GDPR art. 79(2) of the GDPR does not include any indication on whether
it  repeals  the jurisdictional  provisions  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation
or whether  it  just  complements  them.  While  an assumption  on the basis
of the axiom  “lex  specialis  derogat  lege  generali”  would  militate  in favour
of the assumption that art. 79(2) replaces the jurisdictional rules of Brussels
Ia for privacy violations, recital 147 of the GDPR puts such an assumption
in question. In a rather sibyllic and cryptic manner, recital 147 of the GDPR
states:
“Where  specific  rules  on jurisdiction  are  contained  in this  Regulation,
in particular  as regards  proceedings  seeking  a judicial  remedy  including
compensation,  against  a controller  or processor,  general  jurisdiction  rules
such as those of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council  should  not  prejudice  the application  of such  specific
rules.”
58 REGULATION  2016/679  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 27  April  2016  on the protection  of natural  persons  with  regard  to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation). Official Journal of the European Union (2016/L 119/1) 04
May. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/files/regulation_oj_
en.pdf [Accessed 7 June 2017].
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That  seems  to imply  that  art.  79(2)  does  not  replace  the jurisdictional
grounds of the Brussels Ia Regulation, but rather that the two systems shall
coexist,  albeit  not  on an equal  basis.  While  the jurisdictional  rules
of the Brussels Ia Regulation are still in force for online privacy violations,
they will not be applied in all cases that they contradict the jurisdictional
grounds  of GDPR  art.  79(2).59 What  can  lead  to a contradiction  between
art. 79(2) and Brussels Ia shall probably be examined on a case by case basis
for each  one  of the individual  jurisdictional  grounds  of the Brussels  Ia
Regulation.  Apart  from being  a rather  tedious  task,  discovering
a contradiction between legal rules can also be proven very controversial.
It is  probably  the CJEU  that  will  be  called  upon  to solve  the problem
in the future, but the doubts and uncertainty caused in the meantime might
be detrimental to the administration of justice within the EU.
If,  for example,  the most  obvious  candidate  for a parallel  application
with GDPR art. 79(2), namely art. 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, is to be
considered,  a very  unpleasant  scenario  will  automatically  occur.  If  one
looks  at  the interpretation  of art.  7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation
in the eDate and Martinez ruling,  a contradiction between the two does not
seem  likely.60 Applied  together,  these  two  provisions  [GDPR  art.  79(2)
and Brussels Ia art. 7(2)] would create a multitude of different fora in favour
of the data subject.  In such a scenario, the data subject  will  be able to sue
in regard  to the full  extent  of the damage  suffered,  at  his/her  discretion,
in one  of the following  places:  before  the courts  of the Member  State
of the domicile of the controller or processor (under art. 4 of the Brussels Ia
Regulation), before the courts of the Member State of the centre of the data
subject’s interests (under art. 7(2) as the latter was interpreted by the CJEU
in eDate  and Martinez),  before  the courts  of the Member  State
of the establishment  of the controller  or processor  (under  art.  79(2)
of the GDPR)  or, finally,  before the courts of the Member State of the data
59 The German  version  of recital  147  makes  use  of the term  “nicht  entgegenstehen”,  which
implies that the non-application of the Brussels Ia jurisdictional rules shall be the outcome
of their  contradiction with the jurisdictional  rules of art.  79(2)  GDPR. If the jurisdictional
grounds of Brussels  Ia are not  contradictory to those of art.  79(2) GDPR, then they shall
apply  in parallel.  See  Werkmeister,  C.  (2017).  In:  Peter  Gola  (ed.)  Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung  VO (EU)  2016/679-Kommentar.  Munich:  C.H.  Beck,  p.  730,  who  notes:
“[…] Erwägungsgrund 147 gibt vor, dass die allgemeinen Vorschriften über die Gerichtsbarkeit, wie
sie etwa in der EuGVVO enthalten sind, der Anwendung der spezifischen Vorschriften nach der DS-
GVO nicht entgegenstehen sollen. Sofern die besonderen Gerichtsstände nach der EuGVVO neben
den Gerichtsständen nach Art. 79 Abs. 2 anwendbar bleiben, stehen diese den Vorgaben der DS-
GVO jedenfalls nicht entgegen […]“.
60 Ibid.
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subject’s  habitual  residence  (under  art.  79(2)  of the GDPR).  In addition,
the data  subject  will  still  be  able  to sue  in each  individual  Member  State
were  his/her  data  became  illegally  available,  but  only  for the extent
of the damage suffered in each state.
That  such  an unreasonably  overextended  jurisdictional  privilege
of the data subject will cause a long series of problems does not need much
analysis.  It is just an example of how unthoughtful the legislator has been
in dealing  with  jurisdictional  problems within  the GDPR,  while  ignoring
at the same time the decades old Brussels regime.
In order  to avoid  such  or similar  absurd  jurisdictional  outcomes
as the one  described  above,  it  is  submitted  that  a parallel  application
of GDPR  art.  79(2)  and Brussels  Ia  art.  7(2)  shall  be  denied.
The contradiction of Brussels Ia art. 7(2) with GDPR art. 79(2) might not be
derived directly from their  jurisdictional  grounds but  from their  different
underlying  principles:  if  it  still  holds  true  that  the purpose  of art.  7(2)
of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  is  not  to favour  the plaintiff,  but  to foster
the better  administration  of justice,61 while  on the contrary,  art.  79(2)
of the GDPR  aims  to empower  the position  of the data  subject  in terms
of judicial  jurisdiction,62 one  could  admit  that  there  is  a certain  degree
of incompatibility between the two, given that their underlying principles
are  mutually  exclusive  and cannot  be  pursued  at  the same  time.  Indeed,
if one aims to procedurally favour one of the parties, such an aim cannot be
compromised with  the aim to form neutral  and generally  fair  procedural
conditions and justice guarantees. In other words, doing too much justice
for one  of the parties  automatically  means  that  one  cannot  do  justice
for both. Art. 79(2) of the GDPR must necessarily prevail, as art. 7(2) would
otherwise prejudice its application.
This incompatibility test based not on the jurisdictional grounds per se
but on the underlying principles of the competing jurisdictional rules might
offer  general  guidance  in clarifying  the scope  of application  of GDPR
art. 79(2) and the jurisdictional grounds of Brussels Ia Regulation.
For example, another interesting scenario might be that the parties agree
61 Supra notes 52, 53 and 54..
62 That  conclusion  might  be  justified  from a systematic  interpretation  of art.  79(2)
of the GDPR.  Art.  79  is  located  in chapter  VIII  of the GDPR,  a chapter  that  aims
to strengthen  the legal  protection  of the data subjects  in the EU  and,  therefore,  it  is  not
neutral  in its  assessment  of the procedural  interests  of the parties.  Simply  put  like  all
the other remedies of chapter VIII of the GDPR, art. 79 wants to empower the data subject
in terms of enforcement of his/her rights derived from the GDPR.
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to submit a data privacy dispute before a commonly designated court. Can
Brussels Ia art. 25 and GDPR art. 79(2) be compatible? Are, in other words,
jurisdictional  clauses  for data  privacy  disputes  allowed?  The underlying
principle  of art.  25  is  to protect  the contractual  autonomy  of the parties,63
while GDPR art. 79(2) aims to empower the procedural position of the data
subject. Empowered procedural position and contractual autonomy are not
always  incompatible,  if one  takes  the example  of how  Brussels  Ia  has
treated  the jurisdictional  clauses  in consumer  cases.64 Despite  the strong
procedural protection awarded to consumers, jurisdictional agreements are,
nonetheless,  possible,  albeit  with  certain formal  and material  limitations.
Contractual autonomy is in this way not sacrificed in favour of procedural
protection; it is just being put in a certain frame.65 By the same token, one
could argue that contractual autonomy shall not be deemed incompatible
with  strong  data  privacy  protection,  if  jurisdictional  agreements  related
to data privacy violations respect the limits set by the combined application
of Brussels Ia art. 25 and GDPR art. 79(2). Art. 25 of Brussels Ia will provide
the formal limits of such jurisdictional agreements (for example art. 25 will
provide that jurisdictional agreements shall in general be in written form),
while  the limits  that  stem  from GDPR  art.  79(2)  will  refer  to the content
of such  agreements.  Jurisdictional  agreements  in data  privacy  cases  shall
namely not deprive the data subject of the jurisdictional grounds prescribed
in GDPR art. 79(2).66 In other words, jurisdictional agreements that favour
the data subject by expanding the available (under GDPR art. 79(2) grounds
of jurisdiction will still be permissible.
The  same  line  of argumentation  might  also  prove  helpful  in solving
the problem of tacit  prorogation of jurisdiction.  The CJEU has  made clear
in its  Česká podnikatelská v.  Michal Bilas ruling67 that a party might abolish
his/her jurisdictional privileges through a tacit prorogation of jurisdiction.68
That might be a dangerous precedent for data subjects, who unbeknownst
63 See Anterist v. Crédit Lyonnais [1986], case C-22/85, par. 14.
64 See  art.  19  REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 12  December 2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters  (recast).  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017].
65 For the notion of framed autonomy in EU Civil Law see Reich, N. (2014) General Principles
of EU Civil Law. Cambridge; Antwerp; Portland: intersentia, pp. 18-36.
66 See  Feiler,  L.  and Forgó,  N.  (2017)  EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung-Kurzkommentar.
Vienna: Verlag Österreich, p. 336.
67 Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v. Michal Bilas [2010], Case C-111/09.
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to them  might  lose  the protection  of GDPR  art.  79(2).  In that  case,  party
autonomy cannot be combined with the aim to procedurally favour the data
subjects and, therefore, art. 26 of the Brussels Ia Regulation must be deemed
incompatible with GDPR art. 79(2) and thus non-applicable on data privacy
violations.
Further problems from the scope of application of GDPR art. 79(2) might
arise not only from its compatibility (or lack of such) with the Brussels Ia
jurisdictional  regime  but  also  from the general  problems  attached
to the applicability  of the GDPR  overall.  The GDPR  delegates  a non-
negligible amount of issues to the national laws of the Member States.69 That
leads to the question whether  GDPR art.  79(2)  shall  cover also such data
privacy disputes that stem from national regulations or whether it shall be
deemed non-applicable  in such cases.  If  one gives  gravity  to the wording
of art.  79(1)  of the GDPR,  art.  79  in toto  seems  to represent  the civil
procedural  incarnation  of the rights  afforded to the data  subjects  through
the GDPR,70 but  not  to those  afforded  to them  through  Member  State
legislation. If that is true, then the jurisdictional grounds of GDPR art. 79(2)
shall  only  come  into  play  for violation  of privacy  rights  that  stem
from the GDPR,  but  not  for those  privacy  rights  that  stem  from Member
State  legislation.  Practically,  that  will  create  two  tiers  of jurisdictional
grounds for data privacy violations in the EU: for data privacy rights that
stem from the GDPR, data subjects will benefit from both the jurisdictional
grounds of GDPR art. 79(2) and those of Brussels Ia, to the extent that they
can  be  applied  in parallel,  while  for data  privacy  rights  that  stem
from national  codifications  the only set  of jurisdictional  rules  available  is
that of the Brussels Ia.  If the GDPR wanted to unify the level of protection
across the EU Member States, GDPR art. 79(2) does not seem to be heading
in that  direction,  as it  creates  two  diverse  types  of data  subjects:  namely
those that  will benefit from the combined jurisdictional grounds of GDPR
68 Safe for the jurisdictional grounds that are established in Brussels Ia Regulation art. 24. See
Česká podnikatelská pojišťovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v. Michal Bilas [2010], Case C-111/09,
par. 24-26.
69 See in more detail Kühling, J. and Martini, M. (2016) Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung:
Revolution oder Evolution im europäischen und deutschen Datenschutzrecht?  Europäische
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 27(12) pp. 448-454.
70 Art. 79(1) states: Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy,
including the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority pursuant to Article 77,
each  data  subject  shall  have  the right  to an effective  judicial  remedy  where  he  or she
considers  that  his  or her  rights  under  this  Regulation  have  been  infringed  as a result
of the processing  of his  or her  personal  data  in non-compliance  with  this  Regulation
(emphasis added).
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art.  79(2)  and Brussels  Ia  Regulation  and those  that  can  only  resort
to the Brussels  Ia  regulation.  For  legal  practitioners  across  the EU,
the constant  question  of which  set  of jurisdictional  grounds  shall  be
applicable will also not be a pleasant task. 
The second  point,  beyond  the scope  of application,  that  makes
the relationship of GDPR art.  79(2)  and the Brussels  Ia  Regulation uneasy
refers  to the jurisdictional  grounds  established  in the former.  Art.  79(2)
of the GDPR expands the dismantling of the basic  jurisdictional  principles
of the Brussels Ia Regulation initiated by the CJEU with its decision in eDate
and Martinez.  Apart  from being  disproportionately  favourable  for the data
subject/plaintiff,71 the jurisdictional  grounds  provided  for by art.  79(2)
of the GDPR extend well beyond their Brussels Ia counterparts.
Instead  of allowing  the data  subject  to sue  at the domicile
of the defendant  along  the lines  of Brussels  Ia  Regulation  art.  4,  GDPR
art. 79(2) opens the doors of litigation before the courts of the Member State
where  the data  controller  or processor  retains  an establishment.
If the rulings  of the CJEU  in Google  Spain72 and Weltimmo73 have  clarified
something,  that is the readiness of the Court not only to flexibly adapt its
legal  reasoning  to Internet  situations74 but,  most  prominently,  also  its
willingness  to marginalise  the nexus  of the contacts  of the establishment
with  a Member  State  for the purpose  of extending  the scope  of data
protection  law.75 In Google  Spain,  the Court  went  as far  as to declare  that
71 It  must  be  reminded  here  that  while  the GDPR  is  not  neutral  towards  the interests
of the parties  when  providing  the data  subjects  the procedural  remedies  of art.  79,
the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  aims  to establish  a very  delicate  balance  that  shall  keep
the plaintiff  and the defendant  in an equal  procedural  footing  when  they  are  trying
to judicially  protect  their  fundamental  rights.  In  terms  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  see
Hess,  B.  (2015)  Unionsrechtliche  Synthese:  Mindesstandards  und  Verfahrensgrundsätze
im acquis  communitaire/Schlussfolgerungen  für  European  Principles  of Civil  Procedure.
In: Matthias  Weller  and Christoph  Althammer  (eds.)  Mindesstandards  im  europäischen
Zivilprozessrecht.  Tübingen:  Mohr  Siebeck,  pp.  221-235,  esp.  223  where  he  states:
“[…] ine eigenständige Prinzipienebene enthält das europäische Zivilverfahrensrecht jedoch bereits
heute: Sie besteht zunächst auf der Ebene des Primärrechts in den Vorgaben der Marktfreiheiten
und der Grundrechte  … Bei  der  Interpretation  der  EU-Sekundärrechtsakte  zum internationalen
Zivilprozessrecht hat der Gerichtshof eigenständige Grundsätze und Regelungskonzepte entwickelt:
effektiver  Zugang  zur  Justiz,  Beklagtenschutz  im  Zuständigkeitsrecht,  Urteilsfreizügigkeit,
wechselseitiges Vertrauen in die Justizsysteme anderer EU-Mitgliedstaaten […]“.
72 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) [2014], Case C-131/12.
73 Weltimmo s. r. o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság [2015], Case C-230/14.
74 For  a positive  assessment  of that  part  of the Google  Spain  decision  in that  regard  see
the comment  of Karg  (2014)  EuGH:  Löschungsanspruch  gegen  Google-“Recht
auf Vergessen”. Zeitschift für Datenschutz, 4(7) pp. 350-361, esp. pp. 359-361.
75 For a critical assessment see Kartheuser, I and Schmitt, F. (2016) Der Niederlassungsbegriff
und  seine  praktischen Auswirkungen.  Anwendbarkeit  des  Datenschutzrechtes  eines
Mitgliedstaats auf ausländische EU-Gesellschaften. Zeitschrift für Datenschutz, 6(4) pp. 155-
159.
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the establishment must not actively take part  in data processing activities
in order  for EU  data  protection  law  to be  applicable;76 in Weltimmo,
it substantially  lowered  the level  of what  constitutes  “effective  and stable
arrangements” within a Member State and accepted that a mere website that
addresses its activities to a Member State different than that of the domicile
of the controller  or processor  can  suffice  for the existence
of an establishment  in the meaning  of art.  4(1)(a)  of the Data  Protection
Directive,  even  if  the nexus  of contacts  between  the website
and the Member  State  are  rather  low.77 There  seems to be  no  doubt  that
the notion of establishment in GDPR art. 79(2) is taken from the same term
used  in GDPR  art.  3,  which  itself  is  the direct  descendant  of art.  4(1)(a)
of the Data  Protection Directive  that  gave  rise to the aforementioned case
law and, subsequently, that it must be interpreted along the same lines.78
Translated  in jurisdictional  terms,  the combined  effect  of the Google
Spain and Weltimmo notion  of establishment  will  create  a questionable
and probably dysfunctional jurisdictional environment: not only will forum
shopping  be  maximised79 but  also  the very  broad  interpretation
of the notion of establishment by the Court will create an extremely remote
or even trivial connection between the courts of the Member State that will
be deemed as having adjudicatory power and the dispute over which they
shall  adjudicate,  raising  doubts  about  the quality  of the final  outcome
of the decision.  Decisions  related  to data  privacy  violations  and issued
by Member  State  courts  designated  through  such  weak  jurisdictional
grounds  as the establishment  of the data  controller  prescribed  in GDPR
art. 79(2)  will  still  be  qualified  to circulate  within  the EU  based
on the privileged  recognition  and enforcement  regime  of the Brussels  Ia
Regulation.  It  must  be  reminded  here  that  the privileged  recognition
and enforcement  regime  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  is  founded
76 Google  Spain SL v. Agencia  Española  de  Protección de  Datos (AEPD) [2014],  Case C-131/12,
par. 52-55.
77 Weltimmo s. r. o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság [2015], Case C-230/14,
par. 29-33.
78 Recital  22  REGULATION  (EU)  2016/679  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April  2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing  of personal  data and on the free  movement  of such  data,  and repealing
Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data  Protection  Regulation).  Official  Journal  of the European
Union (2016/L 119/1)  04 May.  Available  from:  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
reform/files/regulation_oj_en.pdf [Accessed 7 June 2017].,  Martini, M. (2017) In: Boris Paal
and Daniel Pauly (eds.) Datenschutz-Grundverordnung. Munich, Germany: C.H. Beck, p. 720.
79 Feiler,  L.  and Forgó,  N.  (2017)  EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung-Kurzkommentar.
Vienna: Verlag Österreich, p. 335.
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on the respect of certain procedural  guarantees  in favour  of the defendant,
one of the most  important  being  the procedural  balance  that  the Brussels
regime tries to secure  by its,  more or less,  fair  and reasonable  jurisdiction
rules.  Given  that  the generous  to the data  subject/plaintiff  jurisdictional
grounds  of GDPR  art.  79(2)  neutralise  such  jurisdictional  guarantees
as those  achieved  by the Brussels  Ia  jurisdictional  regime,  the circulation
of judgements related to online data privacy violations will severely distort
the trust of EU citizens in the administration of justice within the common
judicial area, even if none of the refusal grounds of Brussels Ia Regulation
art. 45 can be invoked. In addition, one cannot overlook the concerns raised
by the unreasonable  multiplication  of jurisdictional  grounds  created
by the possibility of a data controller or processor being established in more
than one Member States, which will further undermine the notion of legal
certainty within the judicial system of the EU.
The alternative  jurisdictional  ground  of the habitual  residence
of the data subject provided for by GDPR art. 79(2) does little, if anything,
to bring the jurisdictional  grounds  of that  provision  closer  to the Brussels
regime. By allowing the data subject to sue in the courts of his/her habitual
residence  GDPR  art.  79(2)  creates  another  plaintiff  jurisdiction
to the detriment  of the “actor  sequitur  forum  rei”  principle  that  lies
in the centre  of the Brussels  Ia  jurisdictional  scheme.  Although  such
jurisdictional  rules  favourable  to the plaintiff  are  not  unknown
to the system  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation,80 one  must  always  take  into
account the exceptional character of such plaintiff jurisdiction rules as well
as the compelling  reasons  that  justified  their  adoption.  The jurisdictional
privileges awarded to the insurance policy holder, employee and consumer
are  justified  by their  weak  socio-economical  position  in relation  to their
contractual  counterparts.81 By improving  their  jurisdictional  position,
the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  is  trying  to counterbalance  the negotiating
deficiency  that  is  inherent  for these  particular  stakeholders.  While  that
might  be  true  for several  privacy  cases  as well,  the wide  definition
80 See  art.  11,  art.  18  and art.  21  REGULATION  (EU)  No  1215/2012  OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT  AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast).
Official Journal of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from:http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1215&from=EN:PDF
[Accessed 7 June 2017].
81 See most characteristically Société Bertrand v. Ott  [1978], Case C-150/77, par. 13 and among
others Hill, J. (2008) Cross-border Consumer Contracts. Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 75-76.
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of the subject  matter  of data  protection  law  can  render  almost  everyone
a data  controller.  That  means  that  in a rather  considerable  number
of privacy cases the parties will litigate from a socio-economical equal basis.
It  seems,  thus,  that  the creation of a plaintiff  jurisdiction for data  subjects
cannot be so easily justified.82
It  shall  also  be  mentioned  that  the insertion  of a plaintiff  jurisdiction
based  not  on the data  subject’s  domicile  but  on that  of his/her  habitual
residence  might  also  be  proven  controversial.  Although  an autonomous
interpretation of the concept of habitual residence is not completely foreign
to EU  civil  procedural  law83 and the CJEU  might  probably  provide  one
in the context of GDPR art. 79(2) in the future, its flexible and wide nature
will  once  again  lower  the nexus  of contacts  between  a privacy  case
and the Member State where such a case shall be adjudicated. Simply put,
establishing a habitual residence is easier than establishing a domicile and,
subsequently,  data  subjects  will  once  more  benefit  from a relaxed
jurisdictional rule, without being sure that such a procedural advantage is
completely justified.
3. INSTEAD OF AN EPILOGUE: A FEW LINES 
ON THE IMPACT OF GDPR ART. 79(2) IN NON-EU PARTIES
The previous  analysis  focused  on the impact  of the jurisdictional  rules
of GDPR art. 79(2) within the EU. It seems fair to conclude this contribution
with a few lines on the possible impact of GDPR art. 79(2) outside of the EU.
The adoption of the GDPR signals, among many other things, an official
declaration from the EU that  its  privacy  regulatory model is  aggressively
claiming a wide extraterritorial application.84
Art.  3  offers  an extended  territorial  scope  to the GDPR,85 especially
in Internet  related  activities,  and that  extended  territorial  scope  is  also
82 For a different  assessment  see  Brkan,  M.  (2015)  Data  protection  and  European  private
international  law:  observing a bull  in  a China shop.  International  Data  Privacy  Law,  5(4)
pp. 257-278. 
83 See for example the ruling of the CJEU in A [2009], Case C-523/07, par. 8. Martini, M. (2017)
In:  Boris  Paal  and Daniel Pauly  (eds.)  Datenschutz-Grundverordnung.  Munich,  Germany:
C.H. Beck, pp. 720-721, after noting that the use of the term habitual residence in art. 79(2)
GDPR has been rather careless (“ohne Bedacht”), goes on to suggest that its interpretation
shall  be  conducted  autonomously  by the CJEU  and in  line  with  the interpretation
of the same term found in Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 2201/2003  of 27  November  2003
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000.
Official  Journal  of the European  Union  (2003/L  338/1)  23  December.  Available  from:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R2201&from=EN:
PDF [Accessed 7 June 2017].
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afforded to the jurisdictional grounds of GDPR art. 79(2). Quite remarkably,
while  the Member  States  vehemently  opposed  the application
of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  in non-EU  cases,86 they  displayed  a rare
unanimity  and raised  no  objections  when  the GDPR  declared  its  own
jurisdictional regime applicable to almost the entire Internet.87
One must  not be  surprised if  legal  orders that  do not share  the same
privacy concerns as those dominant in the EU88 react, not always positively,
to such  wide  jurisdictional  claims.  The US  might  pose  a good  example
in that regard. It is after all a commonality that the US has a distinct and,
in many ways, different approach to data privacy in comparison to the EU.89
In addition, the US retains a firm stance in defending their unique approach
to judicial jurisdiction over Internet cases90 that is not necessarily compatible
with  the Brussels  regime91 and even  more  so  with  the rules  provided
for in GDPR art. 79(2).
In the (concomitant  with  data  privacy)  field  of defamation law the US
has  been  rather  proactive  in defending their  notion of freedom of speech
over  the preference  that  the European  courts  have  shown  for the right
to personality. Their reaction was triggered by the unfortunate jurisdictional
outcome in the Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld case.92 In sum, Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld,
84 Kuner,  C. (2014) The European Union and the Search for an International Data Protection
Framework.  Groningen  Journal  of International  Law,  2(1)  pp.  55-71,  looks  critical
at the tendency  of the EU  to impose  its  privacy  model  on other  jurisdictions  instead
of creatively contributing to the creation of better global privacy standards.
85 See  among  others  Klar,  M.  (2017)  In:  Jürgen  Kühling  and Benedikt  Büchner  (eds.)
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung-Kommentar. Munich: C.H. Beck, pp. 99-123.
86 See European Parliament, Session document, A7-0219/2010, pp. 3-15.
87 Despite  its  crucial  importance  extraterritoriality  has  not  raised  any serious  discussions
during the preparation of the GDPR. For a similar assessment see Svantesson, D.J.B. (2013)
Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy Law. Copenhagen: Ex Tuto Publishing, p. 106.
88 Kuner, C. (2009) An international legal framework for data protection: Issues and prospects.
Computer  Law  & Security  Review,  25  pp.  307-317,  offers  a very  good  insight  into
the complexity created by a common international data privacy model and explores what
are the mechanisms that can lead to a convergence of the different regional approaches.
89 For a comparative approach to the US privacy model see Moshell, R.  (2005) … And then
there was one: The outlook for a self-regulatory United States amidst a global trend toward
comprehensive data  protection. Texas  Law Review,  37  pp.  357-432,  Whitman,  J.Q.  (2004)
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity  versus Liberty.  The Yale  Law Journal,  113
pp. 1151-1221.
90 For a well-founded  doctrinal  reaction  to the overarching  impact  of the EU  jurisdictional
system see  Bradford,  A.  (2012)  The Brussels  Effect.  Northwestern  University  Law Review,
107(1) pp. 1-67.
91 For a comparative view on the US and EU approaches to judicial jurisdiction over Internet
related cases see Chen, C. (2004) United States and European Union Approaches to Internet
Jurisdiction  and their  Impact  on E-Commerce.  University  of Pennsylvania  Journal
of International Economic Law, 25(1) pp. 423-454.
92 Mahfouz & Ors v Ehrenfeld & Anor [2005] EWHC 1156 (Q.B.).
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an American writer,  published a book on international  terrorism in which
she reported that Khalid bin Mahfouz, a Saudi billionaire, assisted al Qaeda
to deliver  the 9/11  attacks.  Only  23  books  of Dr.  Ehrenfeld’s  have  been
distributed in England. Based on the distribution of these 23 books, Khalid
bin Mahfouz brought a defamation action before the English courts.  Even
though bin Mahfouz was not an English citizen and despite the extremely
small  number  of books  distributed  in that  jurisdiction,  the English  courts
decided that they had international jurisdiction to adjudicate. In a default
judgement,  since Dr. Ehrenfeld did not appear  before the English courts,
they  awarded  damages  to bin  Mahfouz  and enjoined  Dr.  Ehrenfeld
from further  publishing  the allegedly  defamatory  statements  in England.
Despite her efforts before the state Courts of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld has
been unable to invalidate the English decision.
The undeniably  chilling  effects  of such  libel  tourism  tactics93
to the freedom  of speech  alerted  the US  legislator,  and not  long  after
the outcome of the Ehrenfeld case was finalised the US adopted the Speech
Act94.  Simply put,  the Speech Act blocks the recognition and enforcement
of foreign  judgements,  the content  of which  does  not  respect  freedom
of speech in a manner similar to that of the American Constitution.95
If  the example  of the Speech  Act96 is  to remind  us  of something,  it  is
the value of reasonable jurisdictional claims. While it has been substantially
supported that enforceability in an international context shall not be strictly
tied  to jurisdictional  claims,97 the existential  relationship  between
93 Hartley, T. (2010) “Libel Tourism“ and Conflict of Laws.  International and Comparative Law
Quarterly,  59  pp.  25-38,  explains  neatly  why  private  international  law rules,  including
jurisdiction, shall secure a balance between freedom of speech and personality rights.
94 Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act 2010.
United  States  of America.  Washington  D.C.:  111th  United  States  Congress.  In  English.
Before  the adoption  of the Speech  Act  in Federal  Level  several  US  States  have  enacted
similar legislation at a state level. See for example Libel Terrorism Protection Act enacted
in the State of New York, 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 66, § 3 [codified at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302, 5304
(McKinney 2008)]. For an analysis of that act and the impact of libel tourism in the US see
Feldman, M.  (2010)  Putting breaks on libel  tourism:  Examining the effects  test  as a basis
for personal  jurisdiction under New York’s  Libel  Terrorism Protection Act.  Cardozo Law
Review, 31(6) pp. 2458-2489.
95 For a brief analysis of the provisions of the Act see Congressional Research Service (2010),
The Speech  Act:  The Federal  Response to “Libel  Tourism”.  16  September.  Available  from:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf [Accessed 7 June 2017] and in more detail Rosen, M.
(2012)  The Speech  Act’s  Unfortunate  Parochialism:  Of  Libel  Tourism  and Legitimate
Pluralism. Virginia Journal of International Law, 53(1) pp. 99-126.
96 The acronym  of the act  offers  a good  indication  of its  content.  The full  title  is:  Securing
the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act.
97 Svantesson,  D.J.B.  (2015)  A Jurisprudential  Justification for Extraterritoriality  in (Private)
International Law. Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 13(2) pp. 517-571.
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adjudicatory  jurisdiction  and international  enforcement  shall  not  be
ignored.98 The Speech  Act  is  a good  example  of the negative  impact
of unreasonable  jurisdiction  claims,  even  if  one  remains  adamant
in questioning the value of international  enforceability,  since it  has  forced
a jurisdiction  traditionally  friendly  to foreign  judgments  such  as that
of the US99 to become completely hostile and refuse to recognise and enforce
a certain category of foreign judgments.
It seems that the European legislator has wilfully ignored the message
delivered  by the adoption  of the Speech  Act  when  preparing  art.  79(2)
of the GDPR. It remains to be seen if that was a wise decision.100
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